

EXCOM 82-7008

8 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members

FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director

SUBJECT: Agenda for 15 April Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning (Phase II)

REFERENCES: A. ER 81-8722 dated 12 November 1981  
B. ER 82-4288 dated 1 February 1982

1. The Executive Committee will meet at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 15 April, in the DCI Conference Room for Phase II of this year's long-range planning exercise. Your Interdirectorate Planning Group representatives have been briefed so that they can assist you in preparing for this session.

2. The attached papers on long-range intelligence needs, prepared by DDI-led Agency-wide teams, will serve as the basis for discussion. [ ] DDI/CRES, will highlight them, pointing out the implications for intelligence management. You will be asked for your assessment of the papers and your views on the relative priorities the Agency should place on addressing these intelligence needs. This will facilitate developing the necessary guidance for our Phase III planning on required collection, processing, and analytical capabilities.

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Attachment:  
Issue Paperscc: Director of Personnel  
Comptroller  
Inspector General

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CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR 1985-90/92

PHASE 2 -- TARGET OVERVIEWS AND PRIORITIZED INFORMATION NEEDS

REPORT FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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Prepared by the DDI  
April 1982



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## INTRODUCTION

On 1 February 1982, the Executive Director established the CIA's Long-Range Planning Schedule for 1982. The DDI was given the responsibility for identifying important future information needs consistent with an assessment of the 1985-90/92 environment for each of 17 substantive intelligence targets (13 regional and 4 worldwide). He assigned this task to the Chief of his Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, who chaired both the Agency-wide team and an intra-DDI working group. This report is the culmination of their overall effort, being intended principally as an input to the Phase-3 exercise (Intelligence and Operational Capabilities). (C)

## KEY FINDINGS

### Review of the World Environment.

USSR-Military plans and programs will continue to challenge the United States severely into the next decade. Particularly critical will be intelligence on S&T advances. (S/NF)

USSR-Political. The Soviet Union will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. (S/NF)

USSR-Economic. A successor leadership will have to cope almost immediately with severe economic problems. Thus the potential for sudden changes in policies requiring a US response will be high. (C)

Eastern Europe. Endemic instability will have substantial implications for the United States--for a shift in the balance of power in Europe, for US-USSR relations, and for US relations with the NATO Allies. (S)

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Middle East/North Africa will likely continue to be the preeminent area of US policy interest in the Third World during the second half of this decade. At the same time, the current interest in Libya, which is tied exclusively to Qadhafi, will dwindle. (S)

Sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa will likely remain the priority policy concern for this region. Our interest in the rest of

South Asia. The key issues will be the adjustment of India and Pakistan to Soviet efforts to expand their power and influence in the area, and competition--possibly nuclear--between the two major regional powers. (S/NF)

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China. The stability of China both internally and externally is vital to US security interests throughout Asia, but it is by no means certain. (S/NF)

North Korea. As its leadership changes over this decade, we will remain preoccupied by the growing North Korean military power. (S/NF)

South/Central America. Endemic social and economic problems plaguing Central America will not be resolved in this time frame.

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Cuba. Assuming the continuation of the Castro regime, enmity will continue to characterize relations between Cuba and the United States. (S)

International Terrorism. There will be even more states willing to support international terrorist groups, hence more of them with greater sophistication are likely to be active. (S)

Nuclear Proliferation. The acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons and material by Third-World states and the potential use by sub-states will represent major national-security problems for the United States. (S/NF)

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International Narcotics. The drug trade is so profitable that it will persist despite efforts to break it up; it will directly threaten US forces abroad and the US population at home at least as much as it does now. (S)

Global Resources. The DDI has identified five topics that demand special attention:

--Technology Transfer. It is likely that the United States will experience serious export-control, counter-intelligence, and industrial-security problems during the period. (S/NF)

--Third-World Political Instability and Insurgency. The spread of illicit arms and the increase in the number of states willing to support opposition groups and insurgencies in key countries friendly to the United States will make political instability even more of a problem. (S)

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--Energy and Resources. There is a virtual certainty that late in this decade oil supplies will once again begin to fall below desired levels. On the agricultural front, the ability of the United States to offset harvest shortfalls in other parts of the world without substantially raising prices is likely to decline. (S)

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Changes in Intelligence Needs and Priorities. The Report of the Executive Committee Long-Range Planning Project, completed in December 1980, noted, "We are increasingly diverging from our traditional near-single focus on intelligence concerning Communist military strength toward a broader and more complicated range of intelligence topics in a larger number of countries." That this trend will continue is indisputable. At the same time we believe the USSR will remain the most formidable threat to the United States. (S/NF)

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Implications for Intelligence Management.

We follow on the heels of the Long-Range Planning Project (December 1980) and the "1985 Intelligence Capabilities Study" (October 1981). We endorse their findings. For example, we agree that consumers will demand intelligence reporting on the complete range of targets. At the same time, in most instances, the topics subsumed under each target will continue to expand. (C)

In rather general terms we have strived to sketch the outlines of the world as it will confront senior policymakers in the second half of the decade. But we can go no further. We have no crystal ball that will enable us to forecast the future. Angola, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, etc. would not have been predicted years before events catapulted them into the headlines. Accordingly, we reiterate the need for flexibility in the management of all phases of the intelligence cycle. (C)

Indications-and-warning intelligence, particularly strategic I&W, remains a knotty subject. Given our construct, it was inevitable that the first item listed among the USSR-Military Priority-1 information needs would be "Reliable intelligence on deployments of Soviet...forces, especially against US and Allied Forces" (p. 29). At most, we can claim this to be a partially "unmet" need. Because we can never be sure, it must be included. The Phase-3 teams will have to weigh programmed capabilities carefully against this topic. Being first does not necessarily mean I&W should claim further resources. (S/NF)

ORGANIZATION, METHODOLOGY, and PRIORITIES

Organization. The report is divided into two sections. The first (pp. 1-27) is a set of 17 target overviews--called "White Papers" within the Directorate of Intelligence-- that describes the nature of the US policymaking concern with respect to each topic for the latter half of the decade. They therefore represent the DDI's best judgments of what finished intelligence the Agency shall be called on to provide. The second (pp. 28-69) represents the prioritized, significant information needs that our analysts foresee

for the 1985-90/92 time period; they are consistent with the world as delineated in the White Papers. Except for several of these, which are new future needs, they are current unmet (or less than fully satisfied) needs that will continue into the next decade. (C)

Methodology. The 17 substantive intelligence targets are the responsibility of seven different DDI Offices. The Deputy Director of the appropriate Office drafted the White Papers within his/her purview. They were then reviewed on an informal basis by three NIOs, who made numerous useful comments and suggested emendations. These were discussed by the team chairman with the DDI Office Deputy Directors on a one-on-one basis. The papers were then redrafted, typically vetted by the relevant DDI Office Director, and then approved by the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence. During their gestation they were also distributed--as were the various iterations of the "needs" statements--to the members of the Agency-wide team, who represented the three other Directorates. (C)


The intelligence-information needs statement initially was based on the DDI's listing of collection needs for FY 1984, which was provided the Comptroller at the request of the Executive Director and which was subsequently distributed in conjunction with the Program Call. In Phase 2, the responsible Offices reviewed the listing, applying two tests: would these needs continue to be unmet into the next decade, considering their knowledge of the future collection mix, and would they be "significant." Additionally, they defined a small number of likely new future information needs. The DDI chairman and the DDI member of the Agency-wide team together with two DDI/CRES officers then devised a strawman set of rankings, generally in agreement with the updated DCID 1/2 (see below), which was then reviewed by the Office Director and/or Deputy Director concerned. After the second iteration of this process, to allow the Office Directors to comment on the overall package, the section was approved by the A/DDI. (C)

Concept of Priorities. The DCI's foreword of June 1981 to the National Intelligence Topics states, "The Topics of Continuing Interest provide the Intelligence Community with more general guidance on the issues that senior policymakers believe will be of greatest importance to US interests over the longer term." Because the priority definitions in the attachment to DCID 1/2 equate with those of the NITs of Continuing Interest, it seemed fitting to use the Community-accepted definitions in prioritizing the intelligence-information needs. Once change was made, however. Priorities 5, 6, and 7 have been combined as "All Other." The DCID 1/2 definitions of priorities are



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- 1 -- Intelligence vital to US national survival;
- 2 -- Intelligence of critical importance to US political, economic, and military interests;
- 3 -- Intelligence of major importance to US political, economic, and military interests;
- 4 -- Intelligence of considerable importance to US political, economic, and military interests.



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TARGET OVERVIEWS

(Phase 2)

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USSR-MILITARY

The USSR's military plans and programs will continue to challenge the United States severely into the next decade. Moscow's historical security concerns and improved United States first-strike capabilities will lead the Soviets to take measures to conceal the nature and status of their programs and forces. Increased mobility of weapon systems, expansion of telemetry encryption, more concealment of ship construction, completion of naval tunnels, and development of sophisticated systems for defense and space warfare will combine to complicate US efforts

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programs and to provide accurate and reliable intelligence to support policy formulation and implementation.

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Intelligence on deployments of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate military forces will also be required as Moscow's sea and airlift capabilities expand and offer the potential for large-scale, long-distance movements beyond areas adjacent to the USSR.

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#### USSR-POLITICAL

The Soviet Union will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. Soviet actions and intentions to influence the Third World by exploiting regional tensions and instability will cause the United States to cope with challenges to friendly nations by elements receiving Soviet support. Moscow will continue to exploit differences between the United States and its Western allies, hoping to divide the alliance. The USSR's interest in Western technology will remain high, but the Soviets will also play Western nations against each other to gain maximum economic and political advantage. They will seek to manipulate public opinion to offset fears of a Soviet threat, to prevent deployment of new NATO weapons, and to decrease the level of West European defense spending. Meanwhile, the endemic economic problems and political dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe will pose long-term problems for the Soviets who will continually be reassessing the nature of East European economic reforms and ties to the West. It will remain essential to evaluate accurately Soviet perceptions of developing situations in Eastern Europe, the extent of Moscow's tolerance, and the nature of Soviet actions and intentions.

The Soviets will also remain preoccupied with their China problem, and it will become increasingly important to look for evidence of debate within the leadership on this problem as well as signs of Soviet willingness to become more conciliatory toward the Chinese.

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USSR-ECONOMIC

During the decade ahead, the United States will face a continuous challenge to detect and predict changes in Soviet economic performance and strategy. The economic strategies and tactics of potential (or actual) successors to the present leadership could lead to major changes in resource-allocation priorities, management practices, and/or administrative reorganizations. Because a successor leadership will have to cope almost immediately with severe stringencies in labor, capital, and natural resources at home as well as an increasing burden of supporting its East European clients, the potential for sudden changes in policies requiring a United States response will be high, especially in the areas of East-West trade, arms control, commercial relations with LDCs, and domestic military programs. Reliable timely intelligence will be required on Soviet initiatives in these areas as well as on Soviet relations with CEMA countries and the LDCs, and on Soviet domestic plans and programs for dealing with their internal problems.

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## EASTERN EUROPE

In the next decade endemic instability in Eastern Europe will have substantial implications for the United States--for a shift in the balance of power in Europe, for US-USSR relations, and for US relations with the NATO Allies. The exacerbation of the precarious financial situations in Eastern Europe brings into question Eastern Europe's ability to retain its credit-worthiness. Without access to Western credits to finance the modernization of its industrial and agricultural sectors, stagnation or worse will be its lot. The problem is compounded by the failure to develop effective economic management systems, which in turn provides an impulse for political change. This impulse has already produced a new variant of national Communism--military Communism--in Poland, and manifestations also can be detected and are likely to increase in Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Another impulse for political change will come from the inability of the East European regimes to live up to their commitment to raise living standards.

The changed role of the military in Eastern Europe includes increasing political and economic involvement. How these changes will affect the reliability of the military as instruments of local or Soviet authorities for Warsaw Pact action or for control of local disturbances will be a major question in the coming years.

While Albania and Yugoslavia have slipped from Soviet control and Romania has achieved some independence, instability in the coming years in these areas would be viewed by the Soviets as an opportunity to regain control. This would have serious impact on the Eastern Mediterranean and weaken our influence in the Balkans.


Questions on succession will loom large in the coming years, particularly in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East-North Africa area will likely continue to be the preeminent area of US policy interest in the Third World during the second half of this decade. US interest in the area will continue to be dominated by three key concerns:



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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA (continued)



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The evolution of Iran's revolution and its relations with all of its neighbors will be a major factor in the military security and political stability of the Gulf region and will thus be of as great significance during the 1985-90 as it is today.

The Israeli/Arab relationship now almost dominates our policy and intelligence interests; it is nevertheless impossible to forecast any decrease in interest or requirement for intelligence support. Requirements are likely to increase. Israel's ability to survive not just foreign pressure but internal pressures for change will be a major question throughout the decade. Egypt's key role in the Israeli/Arab equation, and Cairo's major place in the Arab world, will mean a continued commitment for in-depth intelligence collection and analysis. The very real economic and demographic pressures facing Egypt will be the focus of increased US attention.



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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA (continued)

The longer-term impact of such problems as overpopulation or urban crowding, water and food scarcity, and potential for industrialization or other economic development will begin to be felt in one or more of all countries in the region during this period.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Southern Africa will likely remain the priority policy concern for this region in 1985-90. Increasing polarization and instability as well as escalating military activity are probable in the area. Black states will continue to be dependent upon economic links with South Africa while at the same time opposing white rule there. Prospects are high for continued intervention from outside the region, which will increase the complexity of the problem and pose additional concerns for the United States. Moreover, nuclear developments in South Africa warrant a high priority.

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## SOUTH ASIA

In South Asia the two key issues affecting US interests in the region in the 1985-90 time frame will be the reaction of India and Pakistan to Soviet behavior toward the region and the political, military, and possible nuclear competition between these two regional powers.

The key issue will be the adjustment of the major regional powers, Pakistan and India, to Soviet efforts to expand their power and influence in the area. If, in the post-Brezhnev era, the Soviets become even more expansionist in this region, the requirement for US intelligence support to policymakers on this area will increase markedly. India will reemerge as an issue of primary concern to the United States as the Indian leadership comes to grips with the question of whether to go along with or to oppose an increased Soviet role in the area. To the extent that the Soviet effort is hurried or overly forceful India would be likely to oppose Moscow; Delhi's reaction to a continued protracted seduction would be more ambivalent and difficult to gauge. As long as the Soviets are engaged in Afghanistan, which is likely through the mid-1980s, Pakistan's reactions to real or perceived Soviet pressure will be a major US concern.

Even if the Soviets do not up the ante in South Asia, however, there will be an increased need for intelligence collection and analysis on the area. The key question here will be to assess whether (and how) India will succeed in increasing its political influence on the world scene to match its economic and military potential. Implicit in this is an improved capability to examine and understand India's economic growth, military development, and the inherent potential for political instability in the areas of food and population growth, especially in the urban areas. A similar increased capability against Pakistan will also be important, not only because of the Pakistani role as India's principal protagonist, but also because of the likely continued increase in Pakistan's relations with Arab countries of the Gulf region and beyond. The nuclear-weapons capability of both these states will continue as major intelligence and policy concerns.

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## CHINA

As China takes a more active role in the world community during the latter part of this decade, the United States will be concerned about changes in its political, military, and economic policies that might lead to friction in bilateral relationships.

The stability of China both internally and externally is vital to stability and US security interests throughout Asia, but it is by no means certain. China has had a volatile political history, and the transition in Chinese leadership that has begun and will continue during this decade will determine whether the successor leadership will prevail and be able to modernize China's economic, military, and political structure.

Because of China's importance in countering the Soviets, the United States will be concerned about changes in China's military doctrine, strategy, and war-fighting capabilities, especially as they impact on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Taiwan military balances.

During this decade and the next, China's most pressing concern will continue to be feeding and clothing its population and attempting to modernize its economy. Potentially major problems will be the magnitude of China's needs for US grain and other agricultural exports and the general US role in the modernization process. In particular, the United States will be preoccupied with China's attempt to acquire and integrate advanced technology and modernize its agriculture, industry, and military.

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#### NORTH KOREA

During the remainder of this decade and beyond, the US interest in the Korean Peninsula and maintaining stability there will not diminish. The United States will remain preoccupied by the growing military power of North Korea and concerned that it might use this capability in an attempt to reunify the country by military action.

As North Korea's leadership changes over this decade, the United States will be especially interested in the intentions and plans of the new leaders toward South Korea and the risks they may be willing to take to achieve reunification. By spending far more for defense than it can afford, the North might gain a decisive edge in the military balance. Because of the warning problem, the United States will continue to be concerned about the North's military capabilities, deployments, and planning for hostilities. With the heavy defense burden, the North Korean economy has suffered. US policymakers will be interested in determining whether the country will maintain this focus into the next decade or make adjustments to address its economic problems.

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-Refugees-

SOUTH/CENTRAL AMERICA

In the 1985-90 time frame, South/Central America will remain a key policy/intelligence problem. Central America will continue to be the first priority within the region because the endemic social and economic problems plaguing the area will not be resolved in this time frame. Revolutionary ferment will intensify and probably spread. Scant prospects exist of establishing an environment in which private-sector resources can flow to the region and within the region to support greater political and social stability. Given the willingness of the Soviets, Cubans, and other leftists in the region to intervene, reconstruction will be slow and tedious, if at all. Migration, trade, investment, and regional politics in Central America will be key issues.

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Other than Cuba, the Caribbean mini-states are not by themselves substantial US antagonists or partners; yet their proximity to this country requires their consideration.



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SOUTH/CENTRAL AMERICA (continued)

Deteriorating economies, weakening colonial ties, and prospects for instability will present intermittent problems, and key among these will be migration. The nature of the intelligence problem for the remainder of Latin America, i.e., states of little intrinsic importance to the United States, will be a discontinuous one and a relatively low priority--focused on such issues as narcotics trafficking, finance, and political instability.

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## CUBA

Assuming the continuation of the Castro regime during 1985-90, enmity will continue to characterize relations between the United States and Cuba, although the level of hostility may vary. Castro sees himself as a revolutionary pathfinder for the Third World and the United States as the principal threat to the fulfillment of this role. Cuba will continue to strengthen militarily and will, therefore, have a heightened capability and requirement to project itself in the Third World.

Economic decline is also likely, which could lead to increased social turmoil and a new wave of refugees similar to the Mariel exodus. Concurrently, however, pressures to interact constructively with the West will build as constraints on the Soviets to provide bilateral assistance grow. The Cuban political system will remain closed, and policy shifts will likely be more rapid and difficult to predict. The problem will remain a high priority and become more complex as intelligence is called upon to provide the policymaker the timely analysis that can be used to exploit Cuban vulnerabilities--economic, political, and military.

## INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism feeds on its own success; terrorists seek publicity and publicity generates more terrorism as groups imitate each other. By 1990, there will be even more states willing to support international terrorists groups, directly or indirectly, to further their own interests, hence more groups with greater sophistication are likely to be active. US persons and property abroad will be at least as vulnerable as they are now, and probably more so. Terrorists are likely to capitalize on the widespread fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants to threaten, or perhaps even to try to seize, a weapon or an installation. Even if government counter-measures keep pace with the growth in numbers and capabilities of international terrorists (a tall order), the ability of terrorists continually to search out unguarded targets means that the threat to United States and its allies is unlikely to diminish. We also face the constant danger that the scale and bloodiness of terrorist incidents will increase when and if terrorists decide that the public has become inured to the publicity smaller attacks attract.

The Intelligence Community will be required to support counter-terrorism measures, assess prospects for terrorist incidents and campaigns, and provide close support during major terrorist incidents.

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## NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons and material by Third World states and the potential use by sub-states will represent major national-security problems for the United States in the latter half of this decade and beyond. Several countries that currently are near-term proliferation threats

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Nuclear technology, facilities, and material will be much more widely available and far more difficult to control and to monitor, leading to a greater threat of terrorist acquisition or attack. Senior US Government officials will be faced with a broad range of nuclear-proliferation issues in order to establish and implement realistic policies and initiate sound responses to threatening or crisis situations. Accurate intelligence will be needed on the intentions and prospects for weapon developments in a large number of countries; on clandestine, black-market, or terrorist acquisition of nuclear material or technology, and on the ability of safeguards to prevent such illicit acquisitions; and on the nature of actual weapons programs--weapon designs, testing, stockpiling, reliability, safety, control, and military doctrine.

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### INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

The drug trade is so profitable that it will persist despite efforts to break it up. It will directly threaten US forces stationed abroad and the US population at home at least as much in 1990 as it does now. Trafficking in heroin and to an increasing extent in cocaine and marijuana will contribute heavily to growing corruption in key producing states--probably so much so that it will impede US efforts to influence their policies on a broad range of issues. Narco-dollars, flowing through various international laundries, also attract organized crime and will serve to finance at least some international-terrorist endeavors. If production or trafficking are slowed or disrupted in one area--by bad weather or an honest government effort--the trade will shift quickly to another one.

The Intelligence Community will be called upon for information on levels of production of the major drugs, the main trafficking routes, financial flows, and the impact on producing and trafficking nations of this illicit trade.

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## GLOBAL RESOURCES: Technology Transfer

The combination of past Soviet acquisitions of Western technology through legal and illegal means and the continued expansion of Soviet weapons systems through the 1980s indicate that the United States and its Western allies will experience serious export-control, counter-intelligence, and industrial-security problems during the 1985-1990 time frame. Senior US Government officials dealing with these problems will be concerned with Western technology losses to Soviet and East European intelligence operations in West Europe and Japan, trade diversions abroad of US and Western technology, Western technology losses through Communist-owned locally-chartered companies, and losses from both S&T exchange agreements and student exchanges. Information on advanced Free World cutting-edge technologies with important military applications will be critical as will those technologies in which the United States no longer may hold the technological lead. Advanced production technologies, computers, micro-electronics, telecommunications, aerospace, and civil aircraft will be of particular importance in the late 1980s.

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GLOBAL RESOURCES: Third-World Political Instability And Insurgency

As the United States becomes more dependent on the Third World for key resources, base facilities, and markets, political instability in important Third-World countries will affect our interests even more than it does today. Discontent in these areas stems from the increasing clash between traditional and modern ways, from worsening economic conditions in many countries, and from ethnic and other kinds of social stresses. By 1990, the spread of illicit arms and the increase in the number of states that are willing to support opposition groups and insurgencies in key countries friendly to the United States will make political instability even more of a problem. Malcontents and dissidents will be quicker to take to violent means, while an ever-growing number of experienced guerrillas will be available to teach their skills to such groups. The USSR and its surrogates will also have had that much more practice in aiding insurgencies and manipulating discontents.

The Intelligence Community will be tasked with assessing the level and trend of instability in key countries as well as indicating when growing instability could lead to insurgency or political violence. It will also be called on for estimates of the prospects for existing insurgencies.

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GLOBAL RESOURCES: Energy And Resources

The problem of energy and resource availability will be a major policy concern in the second half of this decade and well into the 1990s. At the heart of the energy problem is the virtual certainty that late in this decade oil supplies will once again begin to fall below desired levels except on the most optimistic assumptions about gross additions to reserves. Even during the interim period of surplus productive capacity and falling real oil prices, the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan will remain dependent on imported oil and vulnerable to oil-supply disruption. Indeed, lower real oil prices are likely to cause economic hardship in key producing countries, which could lead to political instability and subsequent disruption of oil output.

On the agricultural front, the ability of the United States to use its surplus-food productive capacity to offset harvest shortfalls in other parts of the world without substantially raising prices is likely to decline. While food production may rise, costs could double because of more intensive methods of cultivation. The United States as the world's largest food exporter will be under intense pressure to solve food shortages and to finance food sales.

The growing demand for limited world resources will increase the interdependence of producers and consumers of key commodities. As the volume of trade expands, US policymakers must be able to anticipate developments that would focus import dependence of the United States or its Allies on particular blocks of LDCs, or on potential adversaries.

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PRIORITIZED INFORMATION NEEDS

(Phase 2)

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